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Introduction
These days, the applications of RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems are increasing due to their convenience and usefulness in identifying objects. There are good application examples of RFID systems such as access control, supply chain management, inventory control, smart labels, etc. RFID systems are composed of three entities: tags, readers, and the server connected to the reader. The communications between the reader and the server are generally safe, but the communications between the reader and the tags are not safe from the adversary. The reader reads the information of the tag and identifies it through a wireless channel; however, the channel is vulnerable to various security attacks. Therefore, in the applications of RFID systems, for the sake of secure communication between the reader and the tags, RFID authentication protocols are used to resist the security attacks and invasion of privacy.
However, since low-cost RFID tags have very limited hardware resources, it is difficult for them to adapt the existing authentication protocols by using modern ciphers which require a lot of computation cost and storage space. Thus, several ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags have been proposed. These protocols have generally been designed to use very lightweight operations such as XOR, rotation, AND, OR, permutation, etc.
In 2006, Peris-Lopez et al. proposed a family of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for low-cost RFID, LMAP [1] and M2AP [2] , which use bitwise operations, XOR, AND, OR, and modular operation. Since their protocols were very simple, they were suitable for low-lost RFID tags. Unfortunately, their protocols are vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and full disclose attack [3] . In 2007, Chien [4] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol, SASI, which supports mutual authentication and tag anonymity. However, Sun et el. [5] showed that SASI cannot resist from the de-synchronization attack. Cao et al. [6] showed that SASI is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack through the man-in-the-middle attack. Phan [7] used the imbalance of the bitwise OR operation to do the tracking attack for SASI. In 2009, Peris-Lopez et al. [8] proposed another ultra-lightweight authentication protocol called Gossamer. But in 2010, Targa et al. [9] showed that Gossamer is vulnerable to the de-synchronization attack. In 2011, Tian et al. [10] proposed a new ultra-lightweight authentication protocol (RAPP) for low-cost RFID tags. They defined and used permutation operation in their protocol. However, in 2012, Jeon et al. pointed out that RAPP is vulnerable to denial of service attack and de-synchronization attack and then proposed an improved RAPP (IRAPP) which overcomes the vulnerabilities of RAPP [11] . This paper proposes an efficient new ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags (EURFID). In EURFID, in order to reduce hardware resource requirement on the tags, each tag uses only two operations: XOR and separation operations. We show that EURFID can resist the various security and privacy attacks through security analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we present an efficient new ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol that is suitable for the low-cost RFID. In Section 3, the security and performance analysis of the proposed protocol are discussed. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 4.
Proposed EURFID protocol
This section propose an efficient ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol (EURFID) which uses only Sep() operations. Some notations are defined in Table  1 to describe protocol throughout this paper. 
Sep(C, K, A, B)
Separation operation which demerges C to A and B according to K. If the bit of K is 0, then the bit of C moves to A, otherwise the bit of B moves to C.
The detail definition of the Sep() operation is described below. Definition. Suppose A and B are two l-bit strings, K and C are 2l-bit strings, where
Then Sep(C,K,A,B) operation is as follows:
j← j+1 end if end for
To easily understand the Sep() operation, an execution example of these operations is illustrated in Fig. 1 [12].
Fig. 1 Execution example of Sep()
Since the hardware of low-cost tags is so limited, it is very important to reduce the number of operations to implement an authentication protocol in the tags. Based on this point, we propose an efficient ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol (EURFID) which uses only Sep() operations.
In the proposed EURFID, each tag and the server shares the five elements, ‫,ܦܫ{‬ ‫ܵܦܫ‬ , ‫ܵܦܫ‬ , ‫ܭ‬ ଵ , ‫ܭ‬ ଶ }. We summarized the proposed EURFID in Fig. 2 and described the detail procedures below.
1. The reader sends a "Hello" message to the tag.
2. If the "Hello" message is received a second time, the tag sends IDS as ‫ܵܦܫ‬ . Otherwise, the tag sends IDS as ‫ܵܦܫ‬ to the reader.
3. The reader searches the received IDS in the back-end database. If IDS does not exist in the database, the reader sends the "Hello" message again. Otherwise, the reader obtains ‫ܭ‬ ଵ , ‫ܭ‬ ଶ , and ‫ܦܫ‬ of the matched IDS from the database. The reader generates two random numbers, ݊ ଵ and ݊ ଶ , then computes 
The proposed EURFID protocol updates IDS after a successful protocol, but it does not update the secret keys for every protocol run. EURFID uses Sep() operations instead of Mer() operations in the tags side. Although EURFID uses only Sep() operations in the tags, there is no increase of the protocol run time. Furthermore, it does not require any additional information such as random numbers or secret keys to design the improved protocol.
Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation

Security Analysis
We will analyze the security and privacy of the proposed protocol. Security is analyzed with resistances to several security attacks and privacy is analyzed with anonymity and resistance to tracking the tags.
Hello
If IDS exist in the DB then obtains ‫ܭ‬ ଵ , ‫ܭ‬ ଶ , ‫ܦܫ‬ from the DB else resends Hello;
If Hello is received a second time then ‫ܵܦܫ‬ ൌ ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ else ‫ܵܦܫ‬ ൌ ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ ; ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ ൌ ‫‪S‬ܦܫ‬ Updating: Fig. 2 The proposed EURFID protocol
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Resistance to Brute Force Attack
The key space of EURFID is calculated as in expression (1), where l is each length of two secret keys, ‫ܭ‬ ଵ , ‫ܭ‬ ଶ .
The K has 2l bits, where the total count of 0 is equal to that of 1. In other words, K has l bits whose value is 0 and l bits whose value is 1. If l is 64, then S is approximately 2 ଵଶସ from the expression (1). Therefore, if each key length is greater than or equal to 64 bits, the key space is too big to be successful from the brute force attack. Actually, it is not possible to extract some secrets such as keys, random numbers, and the unique identity of the tag even if all possible keys are examined in EURFID. Therefore, EURFID is safe from the brute force attack if each key length of the tag is greater than or equal to 64 bits.
Resistance to reply attack
Suppose the adversary replays the messages sent by the reader. In the messages, two random numbers, tag's identity, and tag's pseudonym are diffused by the execution of XOR and Sep() operations. Since the two random numbers and tag's pseudonym are changed each session, the replay messages cannot be authenticated by the tag. Suppose the adversary replays the messages sent by the tag. In the messages, two random numbers are mixed by the Sep() operation. Since the random numbers will be changed each session, the replay messages cannot be authenticated by the reader. Therefore, EURFID is safe from the replay attacks.
Resistance to de-synchronization attack
Suppose the adversary blocked some communication messages. As a result, either the reader or the tag updated the tag's pseudonym. If the reader did not update the pseudonym, the reader will send the "Hello" message again and then receives the old pseudonym from the tag. Since the old pseudonym is stored in the back-end database, the session will be performed successfully. If the tag did not update its pseudonym, the reader will receive the old pseudonym as the response for the first "Hello" message. Since the reader can find the old pseudonym in the database, the session will be performed successfully as well. Therefore, EURFID is safe from the de-synchronization attacks.
Resistance to disclosure attack
In EURFID, it does not disclose any secrets such as secret keys, random numbers, tag's unique identity by the simple executions of XOR and Sep() operations for the communication messages between the reader and the tag. Suppose the adversary does some modification for the communication messages and the modified communication messages pass the verifications executed in either the reader side or the tag side, so he/she can acquire some information about the secrets. But as far as we know, there is no trapdoor that can help these attacks. Therefore, EURFID is safe from these disclose attacks.
Tag anonymity and resistance to tracking
Each tag uses its pseudonym instead of its unique identity and the pseudonym is updated after each successful run of EURFID. Since the updated pseudonym is made by the diffusion of random numbers, secret keys, tag's identity, and current pseudonym, it is random enough to guarantee the tag anonymity. In addition, even if the adversary probes pseudonyms successively, there is no way to know whether the pseudonyms are the same identity or not. Therefore, EURFID can resist the tracking of the tag.
Performance Evaluation
Since the hardware and software power of the reader and the server is generally good enough to run the protocol, we analyzed the performance of EURFID for the tag side. The performance of EURFID is evaluated in terms of security, computation operation, storage requirement, and communication cost. The evaluation results are summarized in Table 2 with some other ultra-lightweight authentication protocols. In Table 2 , L denotes the length of each item stored in each tag.
As listed in Table 2 , each tag only uses XOR and Sep() operations in EURFID. Even though the Mer() operation was defined and used in IRAPLT, the tag side does not use the Mer() operation. So considering on the tags side, the operation implementation space of EURFID is reduced to half that of EURFID. Therefore, EURFID is suitable for the low-cost tags which have very limited hardware resources. The communication cost of EURFID for each tag is 3L. But it is the worst case only when the de-synchronization attack occurred. Therefore, we can say that actual communication cost of EURFID is 2L. Thus, the communication cost of EURFID is low like other protocols in Table 2 . EURFID requires 5L storage space in the tag, which is less than or equal to those of other protocols. Generally, the most important factor to evaluate authentication protocols is security. EURFID is one of the most secure protocols in Table 2 . Consequently, we can say that EURFID shows good performances for all the comparison factors.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags in order to reduce hardware resource requirement on the tags, each tag uses only two operations: XOR and separation operations. The proposed EURFID is designed to use three low-cost operations: XOR, Mer(), and Sep() operations. However, the tags only use two operations: XOR and Sep() operations. We showed that EURFID can resist the various security and privacy attacks and has good performance in terms of both storage space and communication cost. Therefore, EURFID will be a good solution to resist the various security attacks for the very low-cost RFID tags. 
